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Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General
PUBUC PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Deletes constitutional provisions specifying percentage and type of stocks and corporations in which public pension funds may invest.
Substitutes provisions empowering Legislature to authorize investment of public pension funds by fiduciary who must
discharge duties solely in interest and for exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions, and defraying reasonable administrative expenses; discharge duties pursuant
to specified prudent person standard; and diversify investments pursuant to specified standard. Declares public pension
funds assets are trust funds held for exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable administrative
expenses. Summary of Legislative Analyst's estimate of net state and local government fiscal impact: This measure
would have no direct fiscal effect on the state or local governments. The indirect fiscal effect of this measure would
depend on the extent to which the rate of return on the investments of public retirement funds is higher or lower than
what it would have been in the absence of the additional flexibility authorized by this measure.
Final Vote Cast by the Legislature on ACA 16 (Proposition 21)
Assembly: Ayes 71
Senate: Ayes 38
Noes 0
Noes 2
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
Background
The State Constitution generally prohibits state and local agencies from buying stock in corporations. The Constitution, however, allows the Legislature to authorize
public pension or retirement systems to buy stock in corporations, sUbject to various restrictions. For instance, no
retirement system may invest more than 25 percent of its
assets in common stock or more than 5 percent of its assets
in preferred stock. In addition, no system may invest more
than 2 percent of its total assets in the common stock of
anyone corporation or own more than 5 percent of any
company's outstanding common stock shares.
The Constitution also limits the types of stocks which
may be held by the retirement systems. In general, to be
eligible for purchase by a public retirement system: ,
• The stock must be registered on a national securities
exchange;
• The company must have total assets of at least' $100
million; and
• The company must meet a specified common stock
dividend history.
The Constitution does not specify that assets of a public
pension or retirement system are trust funds held for
specified purposes, and it does not provide for particular
fiduciary responsibilities for trustees of such pension or
retirement systems. Fiduciary responsibilities are the special obligations which people in positions of trust have
toward those whose interests are affected by their actions.
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Proposal
This measure would delete the specific constitutional
restrictions and limitations on the purchase of corpor" ')
stock by public retirement systems. Instead, it would aL .
the Legislature to authorize any investment of a pubJic
retirement system's funds, subject to specified standards
of fiduciary responsibility. This measure also specifies that
the assets of pubJic pension and retirement systems are
trust funds and requires that these assets be held for specified purposes.
The major public retirement systems that would be affected by this amendment are: (1) the Public Employees'
Retirement System, which covers state and many local
government employees, (2) the State Teachers' Retirement System, which covers public school teachers, and (3)
systems established under the County Employees' Retirement Law of 1937. These systems currently have assets
totaling approximately $40 billion.
Fiscal Effect
This measure would have no direct fiscal effect on the
state or local governments. The indirect fiscal effect of this

measure would depend on the extent to which the rate of
return on the investments of public retirement funds is
higher or lower than what it would have been in the absence of the additional flexibility authorized by this measure.
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Text of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional
tmendment 16 (Statutes of 1983, Resolution Chapter lOS)
'essly amends the Constitution by amending a section
L ~f; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in !lNeetit ~ and new provisions
proposed to be inserted or added are printed in italic type
to indicate that they are new,
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 17
~ SEC 17, The StMe state shall not in any manner
loan its credit. nor shall it subscribe to, or be interested in
the stock of any company, association, or corporation, except that the state and each political subdivision, district,
municipality, and public agency thereof is hereby authorized to acquire and hold shares of the capital stock of any
mutual water company or corporation when 8tIeft the
stock is so acquired or held for the purpose of furnishing
a supply of water for public, municipal or governmental
purposes; and 5tIeit the holding of ~ the stock shall
entitle !ItIeft the holder thereof to all of the rights, powers
and privileges, and shall subject ~ the holder to the
obligations and liabilities conferred or imposed by law
upon other holders of stock in the mutual water company
or corporation in which tttteft the stock is so held.
Notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in this section and Section 6 of Article XVI, the Legislature may
authorize the investment of moneys of any public Dension
or retirement ittfte; ftM M exeeee is ~epeeBt ~ ~ ~
jti !ItIeft tttM eetel'tftiftee eft ffte ~ ~ eMf itt ffte eemJ
\z
~ M ~ ttIMi ftM fe exeeee ~ ~epeeBt ~ ~
itt ptefel'!'ee !feeit M ~ ~ ~ ee~epaaeB, ~pe"fr!eee.

system, subject to all of the following:
tt:- bttett !Iteett is peg'istepee eft Ii BaaeBat seettriae!l ~
eftltBge, 88 ~pe',oieee itt ffte "SeettPiaes &teftttBge Aef ~
~ 88 ftlBeBeee, ffttt tttteft pegistraaeB sftatt ftef ee ~

~

wttft

pe~eet M

tfte feHeJiittg

~

It =I=fte eelBfBeB !feeit ~ Ii M:ett wmeft is Ii memeep ~
ffte Feeepat De~esit tMtlPMlee Ce~epaaeft Mt4 ftes ~
fltt ~ pe~pe!lefttee e,. e~iml, s~ltlS, Mt4 tlftEli';iees
~peftts, ei ftt ~ ~ fftiHieft eeHttrs ($69,QQQ,GGG),
st =I=fte eelBfBeft !feeit ~ ftft lMtlPftftee eem~ftfty wmeft
ftes ~ ~ pe~pesefttee e,. e~iml, s~eeiat s~ltlS
t'ttBes; ftft8 tIBM8i~ee stlJ'!'ltlS, ~ ftt ~ ~ fftillieft ~
($69,QQQ,QQQ) ,
at A:fty ~pefeft'ee Medt;
~

bttett ee~8P8aeft Me ~ ~ ~ ftt leest ette ftttflJ
fftiHieB eeHttrs (SlQQ,QQQ,QQQ),
e: Befttis ~ ~ ee~ep8aeft, if ~ Me etltstftftemg,
~ fer. itt" esttfteftt tm8eP ffte lttw ge'/eJ'ftiftg tfte tft¥estI
~
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tBeM ei tfte pearemeftt ~

ftftEl Htere Me fte 8!'t'ellPS ~
Eli"fr!sefte ~a)"ffteftts eft #S ~pefel'!'ee ~
&. Stteft ee~epaeeft ftes ~ Ii eesft Eli'Aeefte eft #s eemJ
ffteB !tteett itt ftt leest 8 ei tfte -lQ yetM'!t fte1tt ~peeeEliflg tfte
&Me ei m.'1estfBeftt, Mt4 tfte agg¥eg8te ftef eltPftiftgs 8¥ftilI
tt9te fer Eli';ieeftSs eft tfte eeftlffieft steeit ~ ~ eep~epal
fteft fer tfte wftete ~ Stteft ~ fttwe geett ~ M tfte
1lfft8t1ftt ei tttteft Eli';ieeftes ~ ftftEl Stteft ee~ep8eeft ftes
f'8lti ftft eftfltee eesft Eli"fr!eefte itt etteft ei tfte lest ~ ~
e: bttett ift" estfBeftt itt ~ ette e8m~!l!ty !ftftY !'let ~
eeee ~ ~epeeftt ei ffte eefftffteft ~ ~ etltst8:H8iftg,
ftftEl
f. ~ sHtgle eefftlfteft ~ ifl'/estfBeftt !ftftY exeeee t;
~epeeftt ~ tfte ~ ~ ffte ittftft; ~ eft eest.
?'JefwiMtstanemg ~pe ..oisiefts M tfte eefttt'1lPY itt fffls Beef
fteft ftft8 Seeeeft ~ ei keele *¥*; tfte Legisi8ttiPe fftttY
atithePi2e ffte ift'lesttfteftt ei m8fte)'S ~ ~ ~ ~ensi8ft
6P pearemeftt ~ itt!feeit M ~ ~ Ii Eli,,.ePMee fftft.ftf
agemeBt ifl'/esttfteftt eem~ftBy pegistepes tm8eP ffte !!fB,l
YestfBeBt Cemf'8fty Aef ~ ~ ~ ftes Mtfti ~ et
ftt leest ~ fBiHi8ft ~ ($69,QQQ,QQQ); ~pe"r!eee,
ft8We'lep, ~ ffte ~ tlwestfBeftt itt tttteft ~ ftftEi
~ tegethep wttft!feeits Mt4 ~ ~ ttH Mftep ~
P8eeBS !ftftY ftef exeees is ~epeeBt ~ ffte ~ ~ stteft
tttM eetel"ftl:!ftee eft tfte ~ ~ ffte eMf ei ffte ~ M
~

(a) The assets ofa public pension or retirement system
are trust funds and shall be held for the exclusive purposes
of providing benefits to participants in the pension or
retirement system and their beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the system.
(b) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement
system shall discharge his or her duties with respect to the
system solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of prOviding benefits to, participants and their
beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto,
and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
system.
(c) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement
system shall discharge his or her duties with respect to the
system with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person
acting in a like capacity and familiar with these matters
would use in the conduct ofan enterprise ofa like character and with like aims.
(d) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement
system shall diversify the investments of the system so as
to minimize the risk of loss and to maximize the rate of
return, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so.
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Public Pension Fund Investments
Argument in Favor of Proposition 21

Proposition 21 was written to give public pension assets
full constitutional protection as trust funds. It guarantees
that neither the Governor nor future Legislatures will
ever be able to use this money for other purposes. Proposition 21 also adopts federally tested investment safeguards
to replace existing guidelines. The current provisions, deSigned in a different era, often defeat retiree interests
today. In addition, these old guidelines senselessfy raise
the cost of pension administration for all taxpayers.
Existing law guides state pension investments by listing
allowed investments and the limitations on each.
While this approach has helped keep investment holdings diversified, other needs equally essential to pension
plan well-being have suffered because of these provisions.
No one writing the old rules foresaw the recent major
changes in the national financial markets: accelerated
dereguiation, an expanding financial services industry,
and many new, special-purpose investment instruments.
Because of these changes, the old investment list no
longer serves as an adequate guide to today's safe investment options. Instead, the list's restrictions now hinder
similarly prudent investments which wouid benefit the
long-term interests of the pension plan and its retirees.
Proposition 21 corrects this unanticipated problem by
making retiree and pension plan benefits the only proper
investment criteria. It does this by replacing the old approach with tested investment decision rules which are
modeled on the extensive federal government experience
in this area.
Specifically, Proposition 21:
• Declares all assets of a public pension or retirement
plan to be trust funds. It provides that, apart from
reasonable administrative costs, the only purpose for
which these trust assets can be used is the delivery of
retirement benefits.

• Enacts the sole and exclusive purpose rule which imposes on fund trustees the legal obligation to perform
their duties solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries.

• Makes trustees personally liable if they invest funds
without exercising, as federal law requires, the degree
of care expected of a prudent person, who is knowledgeable in investment matters.
• Retains the requirement that investments be diversified so as to minimize risk. Instead of using current
law's category approach to diversification, Proposition 21 makes diversification choices subject to the
prudent person/personal liability rule.
These four elements have proven effectiveness. They
. are the key parts of a federal law which safeguards the
funds in over 600,000 private pension plans.
By adopting these rules, Proposition 21 meets California's pressing need for investment guidelines which do not
undermine retiree interests merely by the passage of time.
This tested federal approach solves this problem because it places stringent controls, not on the available
choices, but upon the persons and methods of choosing.
This approach recognizes that, when the duty to choose ja-- \
linked to personal responsibility for the choice, the hig:
/
level of independent, professional judgment is exercisea.
Proposition 21 gives Californians the benefit of this
proven approach so that state pension fund managers can
take the best tools of today and turn them to the advantage of tomorrow's retirees. It deserves your support.
LOUIS J. PAPAN
Member of the Assembly, 19th District
LARRY STIRLING
Member of the Assembly, 77th District

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 21
Proponents of Proposition 21 advocate increased speculation in the stock market to allow for a greater rate of
return through so-called "innovative" investments. They
fail to mention, however, that such speculation is accompanied by a high degree of risk and a greatly increased
danger of financial loss.
There is no such thing as a "guaranteed return" in stock
market speculation.
Our current policy of requiring that pension moneys be
placed in stable, prudent investments is the best method
of safeguarding the financial interests of our state's retirees and the taxpaying public. Isn't it wiser to continue
putting these moneys in prudent, safe investments rather
than engage in a stock market gamble?
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The State Teachers' Retirement Board recently lost millions of dollars on a get-rich-quick oil investing scheme.
Allowing further questionable investment strategies could
well jeopardize the fiscal security of all public pension
funds. And we all know who pays the bill for any losses
incurred through poor investments-tbat's right-the taxpayer!
Let's not take chances with our public pension funds.
VOTE NO on Proposition 21.
PAT NOLAN
Member of the Assembly, 41st District
JAKE PETROSINO
Member, Boud of AdministntiOn. Public Emplor-'
Retire1llt!nt System, Sate of CAJifomi.

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency
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Public Pension Fund Investments
Argument Against Proposition 21
Proposition 21 allows investment in common stocks bv
the state's public pension systems to jump from th~
present 25 percent of assets to as much as 100 percent of
pension funds.
A similar measure, Proposition 6, was rejected in 1982
with 61 percent of the voters against it. That reflected a
well-deserved negative response based upon a track
record beginning in 1968 when the current 25-percent
limit was established.
Earnings from our pension systems' common stock investments have COnsistently failed to meet the modest
earnings levels necessary to help fund California's public
pension systems. Using any comparative criteria, the returns on common stock investments made by the public
pension systems have been dismal when compared to
other types of investments by both public and private
sector pension systems across the nation. The economic
security of retirees is too important to be gambled away
in the stock market.
Assets of public pension funds should continue to be
placed in mortgages and other more consistently profitable types of investments to provide a prudent "mix" that
safeguards the long-term financial needs of public pension
")'stems. If approved, Proposition 21 could drastically
- :e other types of investments.
1: ublic Employees' Retirement System (PERS) earnings from common stock have been less than 4 percent
>_. - ually during the entire period that the system has been
ll\-Uting in common stocks. Other types of investments
have averaged in excess of 9 percent per year. The entire
15-year PERS record stands as undeniable proof that an
increase in common stock holdings to an unlimited per-

centage of pension fund assets is a serious mistake. In these
difficult and uncertain economic times, we hardly need to
permit a questionable fiscal practice.
The trust fund language proposed in Proposition 21 already exists in current retirement law, yet public pension
systems have been "creatively" raided by past Legislatures and Governors. The simple fact is, there is no language in the State Constitution which can effectively protect public pension funds from politically enacted
thievery.
The so-called "prudent" investment rules proposed by
Proposition 21 allow a wider variety of "high-risk" investments. This is unwise for a pension fund which MUST
minimize risk in order to preserve assets used to pay pensions which are long-term, contractual obligations to the
retirement system members. It would be better to retain
conservative investment requirements for public pension
systems of present law.
The dismal record in stock market speculation stands as
proof that there is no good reason to relax existing restraints on public pension fund investments.
Approval of Proposition 21 will be a costly mistake for
the public sector workforce and the California taxpayer.
all of whom will be economically damaged by reduced
retirement fund earnings in future years.
Vote NO on Proposition 21.
PAT NOLAN
Member of the Assembly, 41st District

JAKE PETROSINO
Member, IJourJ of Administration. Public Employees'
Retirement System, State of CIIliFomU

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 21
Proposition 21 is as critical to taxpayers and retirees as
any pension measure of the last 10 years-but all the opponents offer is rhetoric and wild claims.
Proposition 21 is not a rerun of any ballot measure.
While current law increases risk by forcing all pension
moneys into a few investments, this measure adopts the
proven, conservative federal approach which cuts risk by
allowing greater variety if the dictates of prudent judgment are met.
And the charge that Proposition 21 will lead to 100%
stock ownership is totally misleading. Total reliance on
stocks would be legally impossible under Proposition 21
for the very reason the opponents cite-it would be foolhardy and imprudent.
The fact of Proposition 21 is that it will subject every
ment decision to greater prudence, not less.

.t
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Proposition 21 should be approved because, unlike the
opponents, it is absolutely realistic about how prudent
investments are made.
The opponents talk lightly of "consistently profitable"
investments. If such surefire formulas exiSt, why aren't we
all millionaires? The fact is the only protection in any
investment is the care and thought which go into it. That's
why Proposition 21 places this requirement of prudent
judgment into the Constitution where it can't be tampered with.
Taxpayers and retirees alike have a big stake in the
efficient management of the state pension funds.
Your "yes" vote on Proposition 21 will give fund managers realistic tools to keep benefits up and costs down.
WUIS J. PAPAN
Member of the Assembly. 19th District

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency

